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In this article, I explore the 
question of how art may help us 
to map and, indeed, inhabit the 
problematic subject position that the 
Anthropocene confronts us with. I 
focus on the landscape photography 
collected in Jürgen Nefzger’s Fluffy 
Clouds (2010) and its use of irony to 
obstruct the power dynamics at work 
in traditional landscape aesthetics. 
I suggest that Fluffy Clouds helps 
us to think subjectivity in the 
Anthropocene from a non-unitary 
position, i.e. a position that is not 
based on notions of individuality and 
identity, but is by default relational. 
My reading will be helped by Ernst 
van Alphen’s interpretation of 
perspective as a subject-constituting 
device and Paul de Man’s notion of 




While the Anthropocene has not yet been officially accepted as a new 
geological epoch, debates about when exactly this “new age of man” 
began are already filling the pages of scientific journals and daily 
newspapers. Just recently, on August 29 this year, an international 
working group of 35 scientists lead by the geologist Jan Zalasiewicz 
submitted their official recommendation to the International Geological 
Congress in Cape Town to date the beginning of the Anthropocene 
epoch to the mid-twentieth century. This is the time when the so-
called “Great Acceleration” started, the postwar boom period in which 
the human population and its energy demands grew exponentially. 
Moreover, it is around that time that the increasing number of atomic 
tests created a “globally distributed primary artificial radionuclide 
signal” in the earth’s sediments (Zalasiewicz et al. 196 f.), providing 
probably the sharpest marker for a new geological division.1
 Although other (mostly climate-related) dates proposed in this 
context may seem to be more consistent with the trajectories of the 
conversation held in the sciences (for a quick survey, see Rafferty), I 
suggest that to engage with the set of ecological, political, and ethical 
problems that the Anthropocene denotes, we should stick with the mid-
twentieth century for two reasons. First, the Great Acceleration marks 
a point of no return. Although prepared by the Industrial Revolution, 
it is only in the second half of the twentieth century that the ecological 
predicaments we face today became manifest. Second, the advent of 
nuclear technology and its disastrous environmental and social record 
helped to initiate the multiple epistemological shifts that accompany 
these predicaments. 
 In this article, I would like to focus on one particular shift: The 
growing collective awareness that to dominate the relation we have 
entered with a substance like uranium (we extract energy from it) does 
not imply that we are—cognitively and physically—in control of other 
possible relations that arise from it. I situate myself here within a line 
1. To take human-generated radionuclides as geological marker allows scientists to make an 
extremely precise claim about the Anthropocene’s onset. Two papers published by members of 
the working group suggest 16 July 1945. This is the day when the world’s first nuclear bomb 
exploded at Alamogordo, New Mexico (Steffen et al.; Zalasiewicz et al.).
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2. I would like to thank the artist and the Galerie Françoise Paviot for allowing me to use images 
from the artwork in my article.
in the Anthropocene debate recently sketched by Timothy Clark in his 
book Ecocriticism on the Edge, which deals with the human inability 
to perceive higher levels of complexity. He refers to Braden R. Allenby 
and Daniel Sarewitz who interpret ecological problems as “unintended 
effects of interference between events at different levels of complexity” 
(7), an argument that is prefigured in Ulrich Beck’s characterization of 
modernity as “a newly uncertain, reflexive stage, the age of ‘unintended 
consequences’” (2). Timothy Morton aptly illustrates this position when 
he writes that with the rapid scientific and technological advances in 
the second half of the twentieth century “our cognitive powers become 
self-defeating,” and due to the increasing pile of scientific studies the 
“feeling is rather of the nonhuman out of control, withdrawn from total 
human access” (Hyperobjects 160).
 At the center of this argument we find a subject that is bereft of its 
sovereignty over its relationship with the world, because it is forced to 
consult science in order to decide what is harmful and what is not. It 
is a subject that has to constantly navigate through conflicting spheres 
of information when trying to understand the wider implications of its 
actions, while having no prospect to settle with any simple truth or 
solution eventually.
 How can we map and, indeed, inhabit this problematic subject 
position that the Anthropocene confronts us with? I shall explore this 
question through the nuclear landscape photography collected in Jürgen 
Nefzger’s Fluffy Clouds (2010).2 The book comprises 72 analog color 
photographs of Western European landscapes, each of which hosts a 
nuclear power plant. The work is particularly interesting to look at in 
the context of subject-formation in this highly mediated stage of the 
Anthropocene, because it ironically engages with the power dynamics 
that are inscribed in the dominant image traditions of European 
and Western landscape art. In the context of the proliferating use of 
landscape photography in environmental activism and art, a reflexive, 
practice-based engagement with this historically complex genre as 
performed by Nefzger is, I think, indispensable for a substantiated 
mapping of the present.
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The images in Fluffy Clouds are page-filling and organized according 
to the season in which they were taken, starting in spring and ending in 
winter. Factual information is pared to a minimum: a list of captions at 
the end of the book informs the viewer when and where each picture was 
taken; a two-page afterword by art curator Ulrich Pohlmann situates the 
series in Nefzger’s artistic work and addresses some of the key issues 
raised by the pictures. In style, Fluffy Clouds mimics a familiar set of 
generic conventions in European and Western landscape aesthetics, 
most prominently the seventeenth-century Dutch pastoral and the 
nineteenth-century German Romantic landscape. The irony resides 
in the smooth integration of cooling towers, reactor buildings, and 
artificial clouds into their scenery.3 People who occasionally figure in 
these nuclear landscapes appear to be oblivious to the danger looming 
in full view in their metaphoric backyards, which enhances the ironic 
effect (fig. 1). Needless to say, the series title can be read ironically, 
too. Evoking connotations of softness, impermanence, and innocence, 
it plays with the nuclear industry’s self-fabricated image of the clean 
and safe energy solution for the future, based on the symbol of the 
white cloud as opposed to the “dirty” black clouds emitted by the coal 
industry (I shall discuss an example of such greenwashing below).
 Thematically, Pohlmann situates Fluffy Clouds within the New 
Topographic Movement. According to art historian Gisela Parak, this 
movement started in 1975 and has shaped a whole new generation of 
photographers who were giving “artistic documentary testimonies” of 
the effects of urban development on the adjacent environment (4). She 
calls them “eco-images,” because they are “used within the framework 
of a political campaign and . . . are intended to shake up the general 
public and appeal to the latter’s ecological conscience” (4). Regarding 
the way this appeal is realized she refers to the medium’s documentary 
quality. Along a similar line, Pohlmann conjures in his afterword “the 
documentary force of photography” (129). However, with regard to 
the effect to which this “force” is used in Fluffy Clouds he ends on a 
more modest note than Parak, proposing that Nefzger’s images help 
3. Clouds have a complex history in the popular nuclear imagination. For an extensive historical 
overview of nuclear imagery in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Weart.
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“sharpening our perception and awareness to lasting effect, through 
a subtle capturing of reality” (130). No shaking up of the public, no 
political campaign.
 I suggest that Fluffy Clouds does not so much sharpen as obstruct 
our perception, if with perception we mean the “chronic voyeuristic 
relation” to the world that photography has cultivated over the past 
150 years, as Susan Sontag famously argued (Sontag 10). By doing 
so, I suggest that it helps us to think subjectivity in the Anthropocene 
from a non-unitary position, i.e. a position that is not based on notions 
of individuality and identity, but is by default relational. Irony plays a 
central role in this operation, and it appears that Fluffy Clouds is part 
of a larger trend here.
 Irony is enjoying a revival in recent ecocritical scholarship. 
Ecocritics like Joshua Dicaglio, Bronislaw Szerszynski, Nicole Seymour, 
Lisa Beth Lombardo, and Timothy Morton promote irony as a self-
reflexive mode of artistic expression and critical thinking that allows to 
productively engage with the problem of perception in the Anthropocene 
without slipping all too easily into finger-pointing didacticism. The 
kind of irony that these scholars refer to has little in common with 
the mockery and cynicism that is often associated with postmodern 
art. Rather, they talk about irony’s potential to create a sense of co-
existence and community. This article aims to continue this promising 
conversation by discussing the potential of visual irony to produce a non-
unitary subject position, using Paul de Man’s notion of the twofold, ironic 
self as a conceptual frame. In what follows, I shall first discuss the role 
of the ironist in Fluffy Clouds before I move on to the site of genre.
Viewers and Victims
There are a number of pictures in Fluffy Clouds that show people 
pursuing their leisure activities next to reactor buildings and cooling 
towers. Examples include a crowd of swimmers sharing the beach with 
the nuclear power station of Penly, France, that is readily visible but 
of which nobody seems to take notice; three middle-aged men playing 
golf with their backs turned on the infamous nuclear facilities of 
Sellafield, England, rising right behind them; a group of tourists visiting 
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an archaeological site near Bugey, France, while in the background 
a suggestive column of white clouds rises into the sky. A particularly 
strong picture in this context is “Kalkar, Deutschland, 2005,” because 
it shows a nuclear power station in Germany that has been turned 
into an amusement park, the Kalkar Wunderland, as if to mock the 
building’s original purpose (fig. 2). The plant never went online because 
of construction problems and protests. The abandoned reactor buildings 
and cooling tower are now part of the attractions. On the left side of the 
image, an almost empty children’s train winds its way through the park, 
while on the right side a sign asks the visitors to keep the park clean. 
The center of the image is prominently occupied by the cooling tower 
which has been transformed into a climbing wall and painted with an 
idealized mountain ridge.
 Images like these have led critics like Thomas Köster to read Fluffy 
Clouds through the structure of superiority/inferiority that characterizes 
mockery. While asserting that Fluffy Clouds is not moralistic, Köster 
exploits the irony in this work to take a moral high ground from which 
to judge the “alberne Sorglosigkeit”—the “silly laxity”—of the people 
populating these images about the imminent danger that cooks up in the 
reactors behind their backs (par. 8). Pohlmann uses a similar, if more 
moderate, tone when he laments “how people are growing oblivious 
to the inherent threat linked to nuclear energy facilities” (129). 
Both authors adopt a moralizing attitude that suggests a self-evident 
distinction between the anonymous group of people in the photographs, 
the victims of irony, and themselves, the onlookers aka ironists. 
 Does Fluffy Clouds, then, reproduce the power dynamics of the 
classical landscape view? It is one of the main objectives of this paper 
to show that this is not the case. Given that the general tone of the texts 
I quoted from is (to a large part at least) not one of mockery but concern, 
this distinction was probably not intended to be as strict as I present it 
here. Nonetheless, their readings fail to grasp the reflexive movements 
of irony in this work, which, as I will demonstrate, effectively undermine 
the superiority/inferiority dichotomy. 
 In his seminal work The Compass of Irony the literary scholar 
Douglas C. Muecke defines three essential components of irony: a dual 
perspective on the situation presented, an incongruity between these two 
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perspectives, and an element of innocence, that is, the victim’s confident 
unawareness of an “upper level or point of view that invalidates his 
own” (19-20). To pick up my critique of the readings offered above, it is 
this last element, the victim’s confident unawareness or the pretense of 
such, that I submit to closer scrutiny in my discussion of Fluffy Clouds. 
Being not only the most original component of irony (it is present in the 
etymology of the term), I suggest that it is through an undermining of 
the dynamics between ironist and victim that Fluffy Clouds succeeds to 
instill a non-unitary subject position.4 
 Irony has the reputation of installing a sense of superiority which 
makes it a close kin to mockery. Muecke is very aware of the power 
dynamics that evolve in ironic utterances or situations. A couple of 
pages after his iconic list of irony’s essential components, he states 
concerning the victim that “one of the odd things about irony is that 
it regards assumptions as presumptions and therefore innocence as 
guilt. Simple ignorance is safe from irony, but ignorance compounded 
with the least degree of confidence counts as intellectual hubris and is 
a punishable offence” (30). The same sentiment seems to have taken 
possession of the critics discussed earlier: The seeming ignorance about 
the danger associated with nuclear reactors turns into a “silly laxity” 
in the eyes of Köster. Indeed, the ironic effect of Fluffy Clouds is 
enhanced by the presence of tourists and other people following leisure 
activities who seem confidently unaware of the ironic situation they 
are part of, as is the case in the images described above. For me, as a 
viewer, they make it easy to exempt myself from the situation and recede 
to the moral high ground of the ironist. 
 However, they represent only a fragment of the series. In fact, I am 
not even through the first third of the book as the dynamic changes. 
Suddenly, I encounter the gaze of two boys who seem to have paused 
their game just to look calmly into the camera, one boy having a ball 
still tucked under his arm (fig. 3). It is here that I become aware of my 
own presence as a viewer looking at other people while not being seen 
4. As the linguist Biljana Scott explains, irony “comes from the Greek word meaning ‘pretence’: is 
‘a dissembler’; eirôneía means ‘assumed ignorance’” (35). She further elaborates: “The ironist 
was a stock character in Greek drama whose function it was to question accepted reality by 
introducing an element of pretence or false reality” (55).
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by them. The boys’ direct gaze challenges my position of superiority, 
because they address me, the viewer, as a constituent part of the 
picture. Another image invites me with an empty camping chair to join 
a young angler who is fishing right behind the French nuclear power 
station Nogent-sur-Seine that occupies the image’s center. In yet another 
image, I am offered a seat on a bench next to an elderly couple enjoying 
the scenic view onto the Swiss valley of Benzau which, unsurprisingly, 
includes a nuclear power station. 
 As the power plants pile up and peopled images give way to 
unpeopled sceneries that offer no (human) victims onto which I could 
project my discomfort of being looked at, that is, of being part of a 
dialogue, the feeling creeps up that I was wrong all along to exempt 
myself from the reality inside the picture frame (especially as a citizen 
of Germany which still has a rather high density of nuclear power 
facilities). Am I not acting just like the people I looked down upon a 
moment ago? Is this, perhaps, the only way to arrange oneself within 
the Anthropocene condition—in a kind of schizoid pretence of safety? 
It appears that their blindness has been my blindness all along. What 
Köster and other critics hence fail to address is that the ironist is always 
at risk of equally becoming the victim of irony: 
If this seems to put the ironist at an altogether unfair advantage 
it has to be observed that the ironist is equally vulnerable, for the 
very act of being ironical implies an assumption of superiority, 
an assumption one cannot make without forgetting either that the 
tables may be turned …, or that one may be subject to irony from 
a level higher than one’s own … (Muecke 31)
This volatility of perspective is fully played out in Fluffy Clouds, albeit 
in a more complicated fashion than Muecke’s quote suggests. The 
boys in the picture do not turn into ironists, and yet I am clearly being 
ironized. The question is, thus, by whom and to what effect? 
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Unsettling Pastorals
As I have noted in the introduction, Fluffy Clouds mimics the aesthetics 
of the seventeenth-century pastoral landscape. More specifically, 
it is influenced by the work of the Dutch painter Jacob van Ruisdael 
(Arena). And indeed, the similarities are striking. A good example is 
the photograph “Wylfa, Wales, 2005” in Fluffy Clouds (fig. 4). It shows 
a stretch of green pastures with grazing sheep along the coastline 
of Wylfa. The low horizon is drawn by a narrow stretch of seawater, 
granting the sky plenty of space to present its dramatically towering 
cumulus clouds. The shadows of the clouds run horizontally in patches 
through the middle ground on the right, creating an alternation of dark 
and light strips of land. The image is dominated by warm hues of green, 
gray, brown, blue, and white and conveys an atmosphere of peace and 
stability. The distant center of the image is occupied by the building 
complex of the recently decommissioned Wylfa nuclear power station. 
The buildings themselves are small and blend so well into this pastoral 
scene that it seems downright offensive. 
 Although I do not aim to impose a direct relation, I noticed a 
striking similarity between the photograph of Wylfa and Ruisdael’s 
painting View of the Dunes near Bloemendaal with Bleaching Fields 
(fig. 5). The painting shows five parallel bleaching fields flanked by 
buildings of the bleachery. The composition of the painting is almost 
identical with that of the photograph. The low horizon equally gives 
space to cumulus clouds which throw an alternating pattern of shadows 
onto the land. The tonal values are somewhat darker, but the color 
palette is basically identical. The same goes for the light. Finally, both 
images show a domesticated countryside, be it with bleaching grounds 
or grazing sheep. 
 What Nefzger appropriates in this photograph is not only a certain 
landscape iconography, but importantly also the power dynamics that 
come with it. Ruisdael’s paintings reflect the gaze of the city dweller 
onto the countryside as a “pleasant place,” that is, “an unheroic, 
comfortable scenery” (Gibson xxiv) with some cottages and fields 
through which the viewer’s eye can wander along paths, coastlines, or 
dunes, watch the bleachers working or the sheep grazing peacefully. In 
short, they are scenes from which no response is forthcoming. Moreover, 
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already back in the seventeenth century the rural landscape in Holland 
was rapidly transforming due to urbanization, giving this appropriation 
practice another ironic twist. 
 Notably, Nefzger’s choice of reference did not come out of thin 
air. There is an image tradition in the nuclear power industry that 
capitalizes on this kind of iconography for its own purposes. A 
recent example for this is a controversial brochure published by the 
lobby association Deutsches Atomforum. The brochure is entitled 
“Deutschlands ungeliebte Klimaschützer” [Germany’s unloved climate 
protectors], and aims to present nuclear power as a climate-friendly 
technology. It was published in spring 2007 in medium magazine, 
a German journal for journalists. Thus, to be fair, it was published 
before Fukushima happened, and also before the series of incidents and 
scandals in the summer of 2007 that would shake the public image of 
the German nuclear industry. However, re-reading the brochure today 
I find it very hard to not read it ironically, especially because the five 
images contained in the brochure could have been taken straight from 
Nefzger’s Fluffy Clouds. 
 One photograph, for instance, shows the nuclear plant Brunsbüttel 
behind a herd of sheep grazing on a green pasture. They seem 
unaware of the storm brewing above their heads as the sky is filled 
with dramatically darkened cumulus clouds. The image employs 
an iconography very similar to Nefzger’s Wylfa image. However, its 
atmosphere is dramatized by a digital amplification of contrast and color 
saturation. Moreover, there is a text written on the image, claiming that 
“This climate protector fights 24 hours a day for the fulfillment of the 
Kyoto protocol.” Thus, appropriating Christian symbolism, the nuclear 
power station appears as a mighty guardian looking after his subjects by 
stopping climate change through its low CO2 emissions. In my reading, 
the visual mention of pastoral iconography conjures attributes like 
strength and progress by presenting the nuclear power station as the 
twenty-first-century version of the seventeenth-century windmill: Just as 
the nuclear power station ensures, according to the Atomforum authors, 
that the land remains inhabitable by contributing to climate-change 
protection, windmills were used in the seventeenth century in the 
Netherlands to make more land inhabitable by draining it. All possible 
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contradictions in this equation are smoothed out on the pictorial surface 
of the scenic. 
 As if to mock this vision, one of Nefzger’s photographs offers a 
scenic view over the fields near Grohnde, Germany, where the white 
cooling towers of the Grohnde nuclear power station visually align 
with the wind park in the front, indicating a kinship between wind 
energy and nuclear energy. One finds a similar narrative of progress 
and cleanliness in the “oceanliner aesthetics” of the Soviet nuclear 
industries (even after Chernobyl) that presents nuclear facilities in a 
utopian visual rhetoric as white concrete ensembles nested at watersides 
in “natural” landscapes (Wendland 282). This image, too, has its 
counterpart in Fluffy Clouds, where another perspective of the Grohnde 
nuclear power station shows its white buildings residing majestically 
over the river Weser in romantic evening light, its cooling towers 
mirrored on the water’s surface. Only the line of willows that is seaming 
the river prevents the power plant from becoming an “ocean liner.”
 Let us have a closer look into the specific power dynamics that 
inform these images. In his book Art in Mind literary scholar and art 
historian Ernst van Alphen re-reads the relation between perspective 
and subjectivity in painting through Hubert Damisch’s The Origin 
of Perspective. I shall briefly recall Van Alphen’s argument as it adds 
significant insight to the issues discussed here. Unlike the traditional 
art-historical readings of perspective pioneered by scholars like Erwin 
Panofsky and Kenneth Clark, Damisch does not assume that the viewer 
dominates the visual field stretching out in front of her using perspectival 
constructions. Instead, he reverses this power relation. In Van Alphen’s 
words: “[the] viewer depends on perspectival constructions for the illusion 
of her or his unified subjectivity. This dependence also explains the 
attraction of perspectival constructions for viewers. Facing a perspective 
painting, the viewer is ‘unified’” (11). He derives from these insights 
a “deeper significance of perspective,” which “is thus existential or 
philosophical rather than merely (art) historical” (11). He concludes that 
Damisch’s “probing interpretation of perspective turns a pictorial device 
into a subject-constituting cultural semiotic. It argues for a vision of art 
that binds intellectual to experiential—indeed sensuous—living” (12). 
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Besides providing a powerful reading of art as a bridge between theory 
and lived experience, this probing reading of perspective enables a 
differentiated analysis of the power dynamic at work in landscape 
imagery. Van Alphen explains this dynamic as follows:
The illusion of mastery and ownership of the visual field provided 
by a perspective painting is an effect of the viewing position: 
seemingly the viewer has not had any position in the constellation 
of the perspective. The image presents itself as third-person 
text that has no room for an ‘I’ or a ‘you.’ But it is precisely the 
implicit ‘I’ that defines the structure of perspective. The lines of 
perspective in front of the painting create the viewing point. It 
is due to this invisibility and to the implicit nature of the I-you 
structure that the ‘I,’ that is, the viewer, can mirror him- or 
herself in the illusion of objectivity and coherence provided by 
perspective-as-seemingly-third-person-text. (12)
In other words, there is a split of the (viewing) subject inscribed into 
the perspectival construction of the image that is necessary to create 
the illusion of ownership over the visual field, which is only reconciled 
in the process of looking.5 Irony forces this split wide open. My desire 
as a viewer to assume the unified subject position that the Wylfa image 
offers to me and hence become part of the landscape is sabotaged 
by the presence of the nuclear power plant. Being associated with 
contamination, cancer, mutation, political scandals, and secrecy, it 
represents a reality I don’t want to “unite” with. Importantly, all this 
is not visually present in the picture. It is my own knowledge that I 
introduce as a context to the picture which informs this resistance. 
To conceptualize it within Van Alphen’s scheme: the moment that 
my learned response to this perspectival, pastoral landscape image 
runs counter my response to what I connect with nuclear power, the 
5. W.T.J. Mitchell makes a similar argument for popular imagery in his seminal essay “What Do 
Pictures Really Want?” from 1996, when he shifts the question of what power images have 
to the desire they mobilize in the viewer. It is “very difficult to know anything about the real 
power of the image,” Mitchell argues. “What one can describe, however, is its [the image’s] 
construction of desire in relation to fantasies of power and impotence” (77).
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“I” implied by perspective splits from the “I” of the viewer (myself), 
causing a series of displacements.
Ironic (Self-)Encounters
Let me introduce at this point another concept, that of the “twofold, 
ironic self” which can be found in Paul de Man’s seminal essay “The 
Rhetoric of Temporality.” Departing from Romantic irony, a literary 
device that has been used by poets and writers to explore the relation 
between mind and nature, de Man discusses Baudelaire’s dédoublement 
of the self in ways that resonate with Van Alphen’s interpretation of 
perspective. De Man argues that the dédoublement or duplication 
of the self in irony is not a form of intersubjectivity (in which case 
the superiority of oneself over another would be possible). Instead 
the “dédoublement . . . designates the activity of a consciousness by 
which a man differentiates himself from the non-human world” (213). 
Importantly, the split occurs in the realm of language: 
The ironic language splits the subject into an empirical self 
that exists in a state of inauthenticity and a self that exists only 
in the form of a language that asserts the knowledge of this 
inauthenticity. This does not, however, make it into an authentic 
language, for to know inauthenticity is not the same as to be 
authentic. (214)
Let me re-read this quote by addressing a particular language: the set of 
generic conventions that form the pictorial system of landscape. It is in 
this sense that the split of the self occurring in language resonates with 
Van Alphen’s perspective-as-seemingly-third-person-text. Irony does not 
only disturb momentarily the unification of the implicit “I” that defines 
the structure of perspective, with the “I” of the viewer in front of the 
image. It exposes this unity as an illusion. Thus, de Man’s notion of the 
twofold, ironic self opens the subject to a range of posthuman readings 
of relationality and displacement. This involves the unsettling awareness 
that one will never fully understand, let alone control one’s enmeshment 
in the world. With the subject being no longer set apart from the world 
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of objects, mastery becomes precisely the kind of illusion Van Alphen 
addresses: it is an effect of the point of view one chooses. Once irony has 
got hold of the subject the position of mastery is no longer an option. The 
trusty and healthy-looking landscape is unmasked as a set of generic 
conventions that tells less about the empirical landscape outside the 
picture frame than about the self that is inscribed in its image. As a 
result, the viewer ends up as clueless as the people in Nefzger’s images 
look, suggesting a relation of complicity rather than superiority.
 We have come a long way from the superiority of the viewer as ironist 
in Köster. What has started out as an intersubjective relation between 
the ironist and the victim of irony, has developed into a reading of the 
“discontinuity and plurality of levels within a subject that comes to know 
itself by an increasing differentiation from what is not,” to quote de Man 
(213). Notably, this ironic consciousness does not resolve in the kind of 
feel-good harmony with the environment that the Atomforum brochure 
promotes. Instead, de Man describes it as a condition of “unrelieved 
vertige, dizziness to the point of madness” if carried to the extreme, 
because irony possesses the inherent tendency to go on infinitely: “It may 
start as a casual bit of play with a stray loose end of the fabric, but before 
long the entire texture of the self is unravelled and comes apart” (215). 
What makes it worse, this process is not reversible. Once the subject has 
gained ironic self-awareness, there is no return to authenticity. 
 This has significant implications for the question posed at 
the beginning of this paper of how to inhabit the Anthropocene. 
As posthuman ontologies (which increasingly gain momentum 
in the humanities) teach us, the human body is always already 
enmeshed in the world (Morton, The Ecological Thought), forming 
relationships of trans-corporeality (Alaimo), intra-activity (Barad), 
and vibrancy (Bennett) that precede and exceed human awareness 
and understanding. To ignore this condition would mean to engage in 
hypocrisy, or as de Man puts it, the willingness “to function within the 
conventions of duplicity and dissimulation” (215-16). Perhaps a certain 
degree of such willingness is needed to inhabit the Anthropocene 
without going mad. After all, it is very tempting to accept the empty seat 
and join the angler in Nogent-sur-Seine or the old couple in Benzau.
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Approaching the end of this article, I want to ask what Fluffy Clouds 
makes with the here discussed subject position of the ironic, twofold self 
in relation to nuclear power. Certainly, Nefzger’s images suspend the 
demand of positioning oneself for or against nuclear power in favor of a 
deeper engagement with the schizoid act of positioning itself. However, 
does this engagement advance an ecological awareness of some sort, 
true to the image tradition of the New Topographical Movement that 
Fluffy Clouds is part of?
 The persona that de Man imagines doing the ironic operations I 
just discussed is the philosopher who trips over his own feet. The act 
of ironic self-reflection over this incident makes him a wiser man. 
Note that wisdom should not be confused with knowledge here, but 
describes an increased sensibility towards the fabricated character, the 
inauthenticity of what one believes to know. A similar conclusion could 
be drawn for the viewer of Fluffy Clouds. While humor is certainly 
involved, irony does not resolve in greater knowledge. Rather, the feeling 
one is left with after having gone through the exhaustive loops of irony is 
frustration and displacement. Yet, Fluffy Clouds ends (arguably) on an 
affirmative note.
 Fluffy Clouds, although betraying a political agenda (the opening 
image of the series shows a sign at the beach of Dounreay, Scotland, 
warning against nuclear particles in the sand), does not end in a militant 
call for anti-nuclear protest. Instead, it shows the dummy of a ghost made 
from linen sheets, dangling from a pine tree next to an empty road (fig. 
6). The dummy’s face is a sad emoticon; on its body a diagonal red cross 
is painted. It is a protest symbol of the Gorleben campaign against the 
construction of a permanent disposal site for nuclear waste near the 
North German city of Gorleben. In Nefzger’s photograph the dummy is 
placed in the center of a markedly static composition that is dominated 
by perpendicular lines. The lower fifth of the picture is occupied by the 
road which runs parallel to the picture’s bottom edge. It forms a kind of 
visual pedestal for the row of straight-lined pine trees filling most of the 
image space. Together with its muted color palette of gray, brown, and 
green (except for the flashy red of the dummy’s marks), the photograph 
conveys a sense of deceleration, supported by the symbol of the empty 
road. It is up to the viewer to read into this image a negative, melancholic 
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dialectics of a failed resistance (which is factually not yet the case in 
Gorleben), or an affirmative politics of insistence. That is, an invitation to 
sit down and allow oneself to imagine a different world to be realized not 
through heroic revolutions but through a collective, modest exercise in 
endurance for which the Anthropocene, if aligned with the nuclear age, 
could offer not only a historic but also epistemic horizon. 
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fig. 1. Jürgen Nefzger. “Penly, France, 2003,” Fluffy Clouds, 55. © Jürgen Nefzger courtesy  
 Galerie Françoise Paviot.
fig. 2.  Jürgen Nefzger. “Kalkar, Deutschland, 2005,” Fluffy Clouds, 74. © Jürgen Nefzger  
 courtesy Galerie Françoise Paviot.
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fig. 3. Jürgen Nefzger. “Heysham, England, 2005,” Fluffy Clouds, 31. © Jürgen Nefzger  
 courtesy Galerie Françoise Paviot.
fig. 4.  Jürgen Nefzger. “Wylfa, Wales, 2005,” Fluffy Clouds, 26. © Jürgen Nefzger courtesy  
 Galerie Françoise Paviot.
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fig. 5. Jacob van Ruisdael. View of the Dunes near Bloemendaal with Bleaching Fields.   
 Late 1660s. Source: Slive, Seymour. Jacob van Ruisdael: Master of Landscape. London:  
 Yale University Press (2005): 143. Print.
fig. 6.  Jürgen Nefzger. “Gorleben, Deutschland, 2009,” Fluffy Clouds, 123. © Jürgen Nefzger  
 courtesy Galerie Françoise Paviot.
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